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There is evidence to suggest that successful lying necessitates cognitive effort. We
tested this hypothesis by instructing participants to lie or tell the truth under conditions
of high and low working memory (WM) load. The task required participants to register
a response on 80 trials of identical structure within a 2 (WM Load: high, low) × 2
(Instruction: truth or lie) repeated-measures design. Participants were less accurate and
responded more slowly when WM load was high, and also when they lied. High WM load
activated the fronto-parietal WM network including dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC),
middle frontal gyrus, precuneus, and intraparietal cortex. Lying activated areas previously
shown to underlie deception, including middle and superior frontal gyrus and precuneus.
Critically, successful lying in the high vs. low WM load condition was associated with
longer response latency, and it activated the right inferior frontal gyrus—a key brain
region regulating inhibition. The same pattern of activation in the inferior frontal gyrus
was absent when participants told the truth. These findings demonstrate that lying under
high cognitive load places a burden on inhibition, and that the right inferior frontal gyrus
may provide a neural marker for successful lying.
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A substantial body of behavioral evidence—collected both in the
psychological laboratory as well as during police interviews—
suggests that lying requires effort (Vrij et al., 2006, 2010). Given
this observation, one potential strategy for catching a liar or
detecting a lie would be to increase a suspect’s cognitive load.
To the extent that limited cognitive resources—including work-
ing memory (WM) and executive functions—are depleted, so is
their availability to aid a liar to maintain a lie (see Vrij et al.,
2010). Indeed, previous studies have demonstrated that a number
of methodologies known to increase cognitive load are effective
in helping to detect lies, including requiring subjects to main-
tain continuous eye contact (Beattie, 1981), asking questions
that are irrelevant to some focal event (Quas et al., 2007), and
instructing suspects to recall events in reverse order (Vrij et al.,
2008). The present experiment was designed to test the hypoth-
esis that a direct manipulation of WM load based on a variation
of Sternberg’s (1966) classic short-term memory paradigm will
achieve the same result. Specifically, it will be more effortful to
lie successfully when WM load is high compared to when WM
load is low—as measured by an increase in response time (RT).
Compared to previous approaches, the most salient feature of this
technique is that the manipulation ofWM load is non-verbal, and
it can be implemented with ease on a trial-by-trial basis.
However, it has also been shown that the exertion of effort
while lying could have multiple sources such as, the formulation
of a lie, lie activation, self-monitoring of behavior, monitoring of
the interviewer’s behavior, truth suppression, and the implemen-
tation of reminders to lie (Vrij et al., 2010). This means that in
addition to measures of cognitive effort, additional metrics are
necessary to identify the source of the effort. One type of evidence
that can be gainfully employed for this purpose is brain acti-
vation data, although the utility of brain imaging data depends
on the specificity of the cognitive processes associated with the
activated regions (Poldrack, 2006). In the context of the present
study, the cognitive process that we were particularly interested in
was inhibition, and its widely accepted role in truth suppression
(e.g., Langleben et al., 2002). To determine whether the added
burden on inhibition contributes to the increased effort while
lying, we turned to data collected in the functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) scanner. At the neural level, inhibi-
tion has been shown to be reliably correlated with activation in
the inferior frontal gyrus (Aron et al., 2004), bolstered further
by neuropsychological evidence demonstrating that persons with
damage to this region are impaired at inhibition tasks (Aron et al.,
2003). This evidence points to the inferior frontal gyrus as a likely
candidate region for regulating inhibition during lying.
Vartanian et al. (2012) recently demonstrated that lying is cor-
related with increased activation in theWM network. They found
that the inferior frontal gyrus was activated more in successful
liars than in less-skilled ones. Based on scores taken from one
condition of the task in which high variability in performance
was observed, an independent samples t-test between good and
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poor liars revealed a significant difference in activation exclu-
sive to the right inferior frontal gyrus (BA 44). Furthermore, a
regression in which lying accuracy was regressed onto activation
in the right inferior frontal gyrus demonstrated that activation
in the right inferior frontal gyrus was a reliable predictor of
lying accuracy, accounting for 29% of the observed variance in
performance. The result suggests that individual differences in
people‘s ability to supress the truth (as measured by activity in
the right inferior frontal gyrus) is an important predictor of lying
skill.
Extending from the approach employed by Vartanian et al.
(2012), and based on Vrij et al.’s (2010) conjecture about how tax-
ing cognitive load might help identify liars, we examined how the
inferior frontal gyrus might be activated when participants lied
successfully under high and low WM load, and compared it to
when they were instructed to tell the truth under the same WM
load conditions. Under instructions to tell the truth, participants
do not need to suppress a truthful response. Without the need
to supress a response, we did not expect an increase in WM load
to have a strong impact on the activation of the inferior frontal
gyrus. On the other hand, to the extent that depleting limited
WM’s resources increases inhibitory workload (Vrij et al., 2010),
we predicted that the inferior frontal gyrus would experience sub-
stantially higher activation when participants lied under a high
WM load than when lies were committed under low WM load.
MATERIALS AND METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
This research proposal was approved by DRDC’s Human
Research Ethics Committee and Sunnybrook Health Sciences
Centre’s Research Ethics Board. The participants were 15 neuro-
logically healthy right-handed volunteers (1/3 female, age range
19–48 years) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
STIMULI AND PROCEDURE
The task required participants to register a response on 80 tri-
als of identical structure within a 2 (WM load, high or low) × 2
(Instruction: truth or lie) repeated-measures design (Figure 1).
Trials involving the instruction to lie were distributed equally
among match and no-match stimuli, resulting in 20 trials in each
of the four conditions. The trial structure involved a modifica-
tion of Sternberg’s (1966) classic short-term memory paradigm,
wherein participants are presented with a sequence of symbols
(e.g., letters or digits) that must be encoded into memory, fol-
lowed after a delay with the presentation of a test stimulus (i.e.,
a letter or a digit). The participant’s task is to decide whether
FIGURE 1 | Trial structure. ITI, inter-trial-interval. ITI varied between 3900,
4000, and 4100ms.
the test stimulus matches one of the symbols in the sequence
presented earlier. The standard finding from that literature indi-
cates that there is a linear relationship between the mean reaction
time (RT) to make this decision and the length of the sequence.
In the present experiment, each trial began with the presen-
tation of a four- or six-digit string for 4 s. Participants were
instructed to encode this string into memory. At the end of the
trial the participant was presented with a test stimulus (i.e., a
digit), and had to decide whether it matched one of the digits
in the string within a 4 s response window. The variation in the
length of the sequence (i.e., four vs. six digits) represented our
WM manipulation. Notably, however, immediately following the
presentation of the digit string participants were presented with
a cue for 2 s that instructed them to either report truthfully or
to lie about whether the test stimulus matched one of the dig-
its in the string. In the truth condition the cue appeared as a
green circle, whereas in the lie condition it appeared as a red
circle.
Thus, the total duration of each trial was 10 s, and successive
trials were interspersed with a fixation point with variable inter-
trial interval (ITI, 3900, 4000, or 4100ms averaged at 4 s across
all trials). Participants recorded their responses using an MRI-
compatible keypad that had separate keys labeled “match” and
“mismatch.”Match andmismatch responses were registered using
the index and middle finger of the same hand. The hand used
to enter responses as well as the keys (for match and mismatch)
were counterbalanced across participants. In the scanner, the 80
trials were presented in a single run. The order of trials was ran-
domized for each participant. The duration of the task was 18min
and 40 s (80 trials × 14 s). Prior to entry into the scanner partic-
ipants completed 10 practice trials to familiarize themselves with
the task.
fMRI ACQUISITION AND ANALYSIS
A 3-Tesla MR scanner with an 8-channel head coil (Discovery
MR750, 22.0 software, GE Healthcare, Waukesha, WI) was used
to acquire T1 anatomical volume images (0.86 × 0.86 × 1.0mm
voxels). For functional imaging, T2*-weighted gradient echo
spiral-in/out acquisitions were used to produce 26 contigu-
ous 5mm thick axial slices [repetition time (TR) = 2000ms;
echo time (TE) = 30ms; flip angle (FA) = 70◦; field of view
(FOV) = 200mm; 64 × 64 matrix; voxel dimensions = 3.1 ×
3.1 × 5.0mm], positioned to cover the whole brain. The spi-
ral sequence was acquired sequentially. The first five volumes
were discarded to allow for T1 equilibration effects, leaving 560
volumes for analysis.
Data were analyzed using Statistical Parametric Mapping
(SPM8). Head movement was less than 2mm in all cases. All
functional volumes were spatially realigned to the first volume.
A mean image created from realigned volumes was spatially
normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute’s echo-planar
imaging (MNI EPI) brain template using non-linear basis func-
tions. The derived spatial transformation was applied to the
realigned T2∗ volumes, and spatially smoothed with an 8mm
full-width half-maximum (FWHM) isotropic Gaussian kernel.
Time series across each voxel were high-pass filtered with a cut-
off of 128 s, using cosine functions to remove section-specific
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low frequency drifts in the BOLD signal. Condition effects at
each voxel were estimated according to the GLM and region-
ally specific effects compared using linear contrasts. The BOLD
signal was modeled as a box-car, convolved with a canonical
hemodynamic response function. Each contrast produced a sta-
tistical parametric map consisting of voxels where the z-statistic
was significant at p < 0.001. Reported activations survived voxel-
level intensity threshold of p < 0.001 (uncorrected for multiple
comparisons) at the voxel level and p < 0.05 (uncorrected for
multiple comparisons) at the cluster level using a random-effects
model.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL
Mean correct RT and percent correct for each condition are
shown in Table 1. Mean correct RT across all conditions was
1452ms (SEM = 80). Skewness and kurtosis of the RT distribu-
tion did not deviate from normality (both ps > 0.05). A WM
load × Instruction repeated-measures ANOVA showed the pre-
dicted main effect for WM such that RT was longer in the high
load condition than in the low load condition, F(1, 14) = 15.53,
p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.53. As well, we observed the predicted
main effect for Instruction in which RT was longer in the lie con-
dition than in the truth condition, F(1, 14) = 55.03, p < 0.001,
partial η2 = 0.80 (Table 1). The interaction between WM Load
and Instruction was not reliable, F(1, 14) = 0.45, p = 0.51, partial
η2 = 0.03.
Mean accuracy across all conditions was 94.4% (SEM = 0.01).
Skewness and kurtosis of the accuracy distribution did not devi-
ate from normality (both ps > 0.05). A WM load × Instruction
repeated-measures ANOVA showed the predicted main effect
for WM load: accuracy was lower in the high load condition
than in the low load condition, F(1, 14) = 8.61, p < 0.05, par-
tial η2 = 0.38 As well, we observed the predicted main effect
for instruction: accuracy was lower in the lie condition than in
the truth condition, F(1, 14) = 7.32, p < 0.05, partial η2 = 0.34
(Table 1). The interaction betweenWMLoad and Instruction was
not reliable, F(1, 14) = 0.45, p = 0.56, partial η2 = 0.03.
fMRI
Using an event-related design, at the first level of analysis
(i.e., subject level in SPM8) we specified regressors corre-
sponding to the four conditions, as well as ITI and motor
response. Although incorporated into the design, ITI and
motor response were modeled out of the analyses by assign-
ing null weights to their regressors. Given the main effect
of WM load, we investigated the direct contrast of high vs.
low WM load. This demonstrated significant activation in the
Table 1 | Response time (in ms) and accuracy (expressed as a
percentage) with standard errors (SE ) in brackets for each condition.
Instructions
Lie Truth
WM load RT (SE) Accuracy (SE) RT (SE) Accuracy (SE)
High 1719 (99) 91 (0.08) 1332 (84) 94 (0.06)
Low 1555 (91) 94 (0.01) 1203 (71) 98 (0.01)
middle frontal gyrus, precuneus, intraparietal sulcus, supple-
mentary motor area, caudate, dorsolateral PFC, and cerebellum
(Table 2). This pattern is consistent with the well-established
role of the frontoparietal system in WM, and indeed specifi-
cally as observed within the Sternberg paradigm (Zarahn et al.,
2006).
Next, given the main effect of Instruction, we investigated the
direct contrast of lying–truthful reporting. This demonstrated
significant activation in middle and superior frontal gyri, bilat-
eral precuneus, and middle temporal gyrus (Table 2). The middle
frontal gyrus and precuneus were activated in the lying–truthful
reporting contrast in Vartanian et al. (2012) and elsewhere (e.g.,
Ganis et al., 2003).
We had hypothesized that successful lying would place greater
demands on inhibition under highWM load than under lowWM
load, but that truthful reporting would not place similar demands
on inhibition under the same conditions. To test this hypothesis
we selected those trials for which an accurate response was col-
lected and compared responses under high and low WM load
conditions. We did a direct contrast of the high vs. low WM load
condition, but akin to what Vartanian et al. (2012) did, we selected
for our Small Volume Correction in SPM8 a spherical region of
interest (ROI) in the right inferior lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC)
(coordinates of the center of mass x = 51, y = 21, z = 12) with
a radius of 10mm. This specific ROI was selected from Goel and
Dolan (2003) in which it was associated with inhibition in rea-
soning. The same ROI was used by De Neys et al. (2006) as the
ROI for inhibition in decision making. As shown in Figure 2, the
high–low WM load contrast revealed significant activation in the
right inferior frontal gyrus under instructions to lie (BA 45) (54,
30, 8, z = 2.49, p = 0.006). This activation was not present under
instructions to tell the truth. Critically, an interaction analysis
revealed a significantly greater difference between high and low
WM load under instructions to lie than to tell the truth in two
areas also located in the inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45) (62, 20, 16,
Table 2 | Activated regions corresponding to reported contrasts.
BA L Z x y z
HI WM LOAD–LOW WM LOAD
Middle frontal gyrus 6 l 5.28 −50 8 38
6 r 4.08 34 0 26
Precuneus 7 l 4.95 −4 −74 60
Intraparietal sulcus 40 l 4.39 −30 −58 44
Cerebellum − l 4.31 −8 −90 −24
Supplementary motor area 6 l 3.92 −4 −4 60
Caudate − r 3.92 12 −8 20
Dorsolateral PFC 46 r 3.74 48 22 30
LYING–TRUTHFUL REPORTING
Middle frontal gyrus 6 l 5.18 −38 16 46
Superior frontal gyrus 6 l 4.67 −4 32 50
Precuneus 7 l 4.19 −44 −50 46
7 r 3.84 42 −60 42
Middle temporal gyrus 21 r 3.65 60 −32 −10
Regions are designated using MNI coordinates; BA indicates Brodmann area;
L indicates laterality; l and r indicate left and right hemispheres, respectively; Z
indicates z–score.
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z = 3.43, p < 0.001; 54, 26, 10, z = 3.13, p < 0.001) (Figure 3).
In other words, high WM load activated the right inferior frontal
gyrus more when lying successfully than when telling the truth
successfully.
DISCUSSION
Our results are consistent with previous work reporting increased
RT in response to increased WM load (e.g., Sternberg, 1966)
and the requirement to lie (e.g., Holden and Hibbs, 1995). Our
findings and interpretation are also consistent with Vrij et al.’s
(2010) hypothesis that one strategy to detect deception is the
placement of greater cognitive load on a suspect. More critically,
however, our neurological data showed that whenWM capacity is
depleted, inhibitory workload (as measured by the BOLD signal)
is increased specifically for those trials on which participants were
required to suppress the truth and respond with a lie.
Several papers in the neuroscience literature have demon-
strated that deception activates neural systems underlying WM
and executive functions (for reviews see Spence et al., 2004;
Sip et al., 2008; Abe, 2009, 2011). The involvement of the PFC
has been a recurrent theme, particularly because of its known
role in inhibiting behavior, which in the case of lying involves
the suppression of truthful responses. Our results contribute to
FIGURE 2 | The right inferior frontal gyrus is activated more for
successful lying under high WM load than low WM load. SPM rendered
into standard stereotactic space and superimposed on to transverse MRI in
standard space. The bar graph represents the strength of the activation
(T–score).
FIGURE 3 | High working memory load activates the right inferior
frontal gyrus more when lying successfully than when telling the truth
successfully. SPM rendered into standard stereotactic space and
superimposed on to transverse MRI in standard space. The bar graph
represents the strength of the activation (T–score).
this literature by demonstrating the role of the right inferior
frontal gyrus in successful lying in the high vs. low WM load
condition1. Specifically, we have shown that WM load differen-
tially impacts brain function in right inferior frontal gyrus under
instructions to lie, but not under instructions to tell the truth. We
postulate that the particular role of the right inferior frontal gyrus
during a lie is to suppress the truthful response, and that suppres-
sion requires more effort when WM is taxed. This interpretation
is also consistent with the RT difference observed between the
high and low load conditions when participants were instructed
to lie.
One could argue that our participants might have adopted
a task-switching strategy under instructions to lie. In other
words, the instruction to lie could invoke a switch in the map-
ping between stimulus and response, and as such reveal little
about the participants’ intention to lie. Our survey of the recent
task-switching literature suggests that such an interpretation is
unlikely. Specifically, in several of the papers we reviewed (e.g.,
Meiran, 2000; Vu and Proctor, 2004; Crone et al., 2006), when
participants were cued to indicate the mapping to be applied to
the stimulus, the cost in terms of response time for switching
tended to be around 100ms. If our lying manipulation trig-
gered a strategy in which participants simply reassigned the
stimulus-response mapping depending on the cue, we should
have witnessed a similar cost in response time. By contrast, our
comparatively large RT cost (over 300ms) suggests more effort-
ful processing of the stimulus, and that the activation exhibited in
the right inferior frontal gyrus is more likely associated with lying
rather than simple task switching.
It has been noted before that an important limitation of stud-
ies of lie detection involves the use of experimental designs in
which participants were instructed to lie on demand (see Sip et al.,
2008). This criticism raises important concerns about the eco-
logical validity of the employed methodologies and by extension,
empirical findings. Two recent studies have challenged this crit-
icism by enabling participants to engage in spontaneous lying.
Greene and Paxton (2009) instructed their participants to pre-
dict the outcomes of computerized coin flips while they were
being scanned with fMRI. Correct predictions were rewarded
by monetary gain. Importantly, in some trials participants were
rewarded based on self-reported accuracy. This allowed them
to gain money dishonestly by lying about the accuracy of their
predictions. Indeed, given this opportunity many participants
behaved dishonestly by lying about their predictions, assessed by
improbably high levels of deviation from chance (i.e., 50% for
coin flips). Their fMRI results revealed that lying was associated
with neural activity in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), dorsolat-
eral PFC and the inferior frontal gyrus. In addition, activation in
these regions was also associated with individual differences in
the frequency of lying. This individual-differences result is par-
ticularly interesting because it links a tendency to engage in lying
1Despite the low z -score in relation to the simple main effect of WM load
under instructions to lie, the results were consistent with the interaction anal-
ysis that also revealed significantly greater difference in activation in right
inferior frontal gyrus between high and low WM load under instructions to
successfully lie than to tell the truth.
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to the same region that Vartanian et al. (2012) found to predict
lying skill—the right inferior frontal gyrus.
In a more recent study, Ding et al. (2013) used near-infrared
spectroscopy (fNIRS) to study spontaneous deception. NIRS is
a non-invasive imaging method that allows in-vivo photometric
measurement of changes in the concentrations of oxygenated and
deoxygenated hemoglobin in the cortex, and can thus be used
to characterize physiological blood oxygenation changes in rela-
tion to cognitive tasks. The participants’ task was to predict, on
each trial, the side of the screen in which a coin would appear.
Participants put each of their hands in one of two drawers of a
desk (so their hand movements would not be directly visible to
the experimenter). Participants made their predictions by mov-
ing their hand corresponding to the predicted side. Following
the presentation of the coin on the screen, a message on the
screen asked them whether they had guessed the location of the
coin correctly. However, unbeknownst to the participants, the
experimenters had installed hidden cameras inside the draw-
ers to record the movement of each participant’s hands. This
enabled the experimenters to determine, on a trial-by-trial basis,
whether the participants had engaged in spontaneous deception.
The results demonstrated that lying was correlated with increased
activity in left superior frontal gyrus (BA 6)—the area also acti-
vated in Vartanian et al. (2012) and the present study in the
lying–truthful contrast. Thus, the studies by Greene and Paxton
(2009) and Ding et al. (2013) demonstrate that the PFC plays a
role in deception—regardless of whether it occurs spontaneously
or is triggered on demand. Nevertheless, given that standard fMRI
activation patterns are expressed as subtractions, not only is the
choice of an appropriate control condition vis-à-vis lying critical
for meaningful interpretation of results (Friston et al., 1996), but
also vital for a meaningful comparison of the findings reported
across laboratories.
Based on recent theoretical and methodological advances in
the neuroscience of deception, it would appear that neuroimag-
ing has the potential to eventually develop into a useful part of
the forensic toolkit for lie detection (for reviews see Abe, 2009,
2011). However, important questions remain unanswered. For
example, because neuroimaging studies are correlational, they
cannot definitively determine the necessity of any brain region
for deception. Evidence that can determine necessity is provided
by loss-of-function studies that investigate permanent inability to
lie as a function of neuropsychological impairment, or a tran-
sient inability to lie due to “temporary lesions” instantiated using
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) or transcranial direct
current stimulation (tDCS) (for a review see Luber et al., 2009).
Unfortunately, evidence from loss-of-function studies regard-
ing the role of PFC in deception has been inconsistent. For
example, Luber and colleagues, using a variant of the Guilty
Knowledge Test [adapted from Langleben et al. (2002, 2005)],
applied TMS pulses to left DLPFC and parietal cortex to disrupt
the neural circuitry shown to be correlated with the forma-
tion of deceptive responses. The results demonstrated that TMS
pulses applied exclusively to the parietal cortex increased RT
by 20%, whereas the same stimulation applied to left DLPFC
alone had no effect on RT. These results cast doubt on the
necessity of PFC for the formation of lies (see also Verschuere
et al., 2012). On the other hand, Priori et al. (2008) found that
applying anodal tDCS to bilateral DLPFC did increase RT for
denial lies. The inconsistency suggests that continued study is
needed to determine precisely the conditions under which PFC
and its subregions necessarily contribute to specific aspects of
deception.
In addition, there does not appear to be an activation pat-
tern that is unique to lying or deception (Wolpe et al., 2005;
Appelbaum, 2007; Sip et al., 2008). Rather, as is the case with
other higher-order mental processes such as reasoning and deci-
sion making (Goel, 2007; Frank et al., 2009), lying and deception
appear to be built on multiple neural systems that are differen-
tially activated as a function of task and contextual demands. In
the case of lying and deception those processes include, among
others, WM, error monitoring, response selection, and target
detection (Hester et al., 2004; Huettel and McCarthy, 2004;
Zarahn et al., 2006). This makes the use of fMRI for lie detection
in forensic and legal settings challenging, given that practition-
ers in applied settings will be unable to make clear-cut judgments
of guilt based on fMRI data alone. However, neuroimaging data
could comprise one of many components of a broader arsenal
for detecting deception. For example, according to the “infor-
mation gathering” approach to lie detection, interviewers are
instructed to focus on gathering verbal information from sus-
pects that can be subsequently checked for inconsistencies against
available evidence (Vrij et al., 2010). The approach is predicated
on not focusing on a single cue, but rather collecting and cross-
referencing their consistency. By providing neural information,
neuroimaging evidence can contribute to the forensic decision-
making apparatus in this context. This componential approach
was reinforced in a recent report by the National Academy of
Sciences (2008). We suggest that a broad set of metrics that
combines verbal, non-verbal, and neural data provides the most
promising framework for lie detection in the lab and elsewhere.
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